A Devil of a Whipping Page 9

  As Morgan readied his forces, Tarleton’s men at Burr’s Mill got what sleep they could. Tarleton continued to collect information and plan for the next day. He used his own Americans well, including Alexander Chesney. “To get intelligence of Morgan’s situation he sent me out. . . . I rode to my father’s who said Morgan was gone to the Old-fields about an hour before. . . . I immediately returned to Col Tarleton and found he had marched towards the Old fields. I overtook them before 10 oclock . . . on Thickety Creek.”44 Tarleton also interrogated at least one prisoner who claimed to be an American militia colonel. About midnight, scouts brought word “of a corps of mountaineers being upon the march from Green river.”45 Tarleton mulled over intelligence reports and planned his movements. The British had to prevent any junction of Morgan and his reinforcements and attack if the Americans attempted crossing the Broad River. Since the Americans were within five miles of the river, Tarleton would have to move early to catch Morgan at the river crossing about seventeen miles from Burr’s Mill.

  Around 2:00 A.M., Tarleton roused his men. Lieutenant MacKenzie marched as the light infantry went out first and passed through the pickets when the “pursuit recommenced by two o’clock.” At “three o’clock in the morning of the 17th, the pickets being called in, the British troops .. . were directed to follow the route the Americans had taken the preceding evening.”46 It was not difficult to follow the Americans. Large numbers of men, horses, and wagons churned up the rain-soaked dirt roads. Tarleton’s comments show the road was only a track or “byway.” They didn’t take a “main” road until much closer to Cowpens.

  The clear trail guided the British, but they had to take care that an American ambush was not sprung on them. The British approach march was slow “on account of the time employed in examining the front and flanks as they proceeded.” They marched in a tactical formation allowing rapid deployment to front, rear, or flank. “Three [sic] companies of light infantry, supported by the legion infantry, formed the advance; the 7th regiment, the guns, and the 1st battalion of the 71st, composed the center; and the cavalry and mounted infantry brought up the rear.”47

  Even with artillery, the march was faster than usual because “the baggage and waggons were ordered to remain upon their ground till daybreak, under the protection of a detachment from each corps.” Wagons would slow the march because “the ground which the Americans had passed . . . [was] broken, and much intersected by creeks and ravines,” and “marshes.”48 Using the torn-up road and getting across ravines, wagons would have slowed Tarleton’s advance to a crawl when he most needed speed to catch Morgan.

  By all accounts, the British had a difficult time “swimming horses and felling trees for bridges” on this exhausting march to contact. Lieutenant Roderick MacKenzie, traveling with his light infantry company, may have exaggerated, but crossing knee-deep streams in January is hard on mind and body. Natural obstacles were augmented by American militia who, if they did not actively oppose Tarleton, tried to “set the woods on fire in two or three places, which no doubt retarded Tarleton’s pursuit each time at least a fourth of an hour.”49

  American scouts saw the British break camp and sent word to Morgan; others observed the march. A detachment was probably on the high ground above three fords crossing Macedonia Creek. Here, most probably because light infantry pointmen heard movements north of the creek, “an advanced guard of cavalry was ordered to the front.”50 Tarleton was prudent in putting mounted men at the front of the column. Dragoons could move more rapidly, scout farther ahead, and report back more quickly.

  By the time the dragoons took the lead, Morgan knew Tarleton was closing in. A man on horseback, even moving discreetly in the night, could cover the twelve miles from Burr’s Mill in less than an hour. At 3:30 A.M., Morgan knew Tarleton’s infantry could not reach the Cowpens before 6:30, even at the killing pace of fifteen minutes per mile.51 Time and distance gave the Americans at least another two hours of sleep. In the interim between the scouts’ first notice of Tarleton’s movement and the final warning from outlying videttes, Morgan took his own council and also offered a prayer.52

  As the British drew nearer, Morgan’s scouts continued to report. A last warning by watchers above Macedonia Creek informed Morgan that “One hour before daylight . . . they had advanced within five miles of our camp.”53On 17 January sunrise was about 7:36 A.M. in Spartanburg, South Carolina. The weather was cloudy and very humid, so actually viewing the sun was problematical. Since the Americans were in position at sunrise, it must have been approximately 5:30 A.M. when the scout came in. This time agrees with Tarleton’s observation that the British crossed Macedonia Creek “before dawn.”54

  The timeframe shows the British took about three hours to cover the first seven miles, an indication of how difficult the marching conditions were. The British vanguard was moving at the rate of a mile every twenty-five minutes. The British still had an hour’s marching to cover the last five miles, but now they were marching on higher ground, following drier roads over a more level course without crossing a major stream. They moved even faster because dragoons were checking for ambushes.

  Morgan’s appreciation of Tarleton’s marching speed can be seen in how rapidly his own men moved into position. “Before day Reced Information that Col Tarlton Was Within Five Miles of us With a Strong Body of Horse and Infantry Whereon We got up and put Oursevles in Order of Battle.” Rapid movement into battle formation was necessary because “Tarleton came on like a thunder storm. . . . After the tidings of his approach came into camp.—in the night,—we were all awakened, ordered under arms, and formed in order of battle by daybreak.”55

  As Morgan’s infantry moved into position, Washington took steps to verify the reports. “Sergeant Everhart . . . [and] ten men, . . . [were] sent to Reconnoitre Lt. Colonel Tarletons Army.” The patrol went out from the Cowpens, trotting down the Green River Road to the American forward outpost “stationed three miles in advance.” This post was located where several roads came together; the videttes could observe the approaches without moving any appreciable distance.56

  Captain Joshua Inman of Georgia commanded the videttes. They would provide initial resistance to any British advance and send a last-minute warning of Tarleton’s approach. Probably Inman was given this assignment because his company of Georgia Refugees were to be skirmishers.57 Other videttes were Continental dragoons under Lieutenant Leonard Anderson, and they accompanied Everheart farther down the road. Because they knew the country, two Union County men, Samuel Clowney and Henry W. Deshasure, went with them. After moving approximately a mile, “they came almost in contact with the advanced guard of the British army; they wheeled, and were pursued.”58

  Outnumbered four or five to one, the Americans had no chance in a fight. Their mission was to learn Tarleton’s location and bring word back to Morgan. “Ten men returned, and gave you information of the approach of the Enemy.”59 Two men, “after a severe and bloody contest between the advance of Tarleton and his party” were captured. The Americans were caught because “the advanced Guard . . . were mounted . . . on some of the fleetest race horses . . . in this Country.” Everheart’s “horse being shot he was captured early in the morning by Quarter Master Wade . . . [and] taken to Col Tarlton.” “Our army at this point of time [was] perhaps three miles in the rear.”60

  Immediately after the British dragoons clashed with the American videttes, “two troops of dragoons, under Captain Ogilvie, of the legion, were then ordered to reinforce the advanced guard, and to harass the rear of the enemy.” Tarleton proceeded to question the prisoners and “from them information was received that the Americans had halted, and were forming at a place called the Cowpens.”61 A sense of Tarleton’s interview survives in Everheart’s pension application. “Dismounting from his horse, that officer asked this petitioner after some previous conversation if he expected Mr. Washington & Mr. Morgan would fight him that day. Yes if they can keep together only two hundred men was the reply. Then said he
it will be another Gates’ defeat. I hope to God it will be another Tarlton’s defeat said this petitioner. I am Col. Tarlton Sir. And I am Sergeant Everheart.”62

  Very shortly after Tarleton began speaking with Everheart, British dragoons encountered the American skirmish line at Cowpens. They “reported that the American troops were halted and forming.”63 During the interval, Tarleton finished talking with Everheart and moved forward to inspect the American lines.

  Morgan’s videttes had opposed the advance. Between first contact and British deployment, American resistance stiffened. South Carolina militiaman James Caldwellwas

  one of the riflemen thrown forward as sharp-shooters to harrass the enemy on his approach to the Cowpens. They commenced the attack upon Tarleton’s columns, two miles in advance of Morgan’s line of battle. Large trees . . . were covers for the riflemen against the fire of the advancing columns; but afforded no protection against the charges of the cavalry, who scoured the woods as the infantry advanced. In one of these charges Caldwell was dislodged, and fighting as long as he was able with the butt of his rifle, he was literally cut to pieces by the broadsword of a dragoon. His . . . head, face and hands were covered with scars.64

  American resistance forced British dragoons to sweep the roadsides for ambush and slowed their advance for the last two miles. With cavalry skirmishing, the infantry moved rapidly. Daylight had not yet occurred when the British arrived at the lower end of the fields around Cowpens.65

  Not all of Morgan’s men went to their fighting positions immediately. Most of “the Army moved in the night about half a miles [sic] from the place they were encamped [to] the place selected for the Battle leaving some men to keep up the fires untill [sic] day light.”66 Maintaining the fires may have been a way to reassure men they could retire to a warm camp if the British did not materialize, or it may have been a ruse to decoy the British should they attack by any route other than the Green River Road.

  Morgan’s preparations throughout the night were not in vain. His men were fed and resting in line of battle on ground of his own choosing. They knew what was expected. Morgan was “in a popular and forcible style of elocution haranguing them.”67 Other officers did likewise, including “Major Jackson of Georgia who also spoke to the militia.” Jackson, as brigade major to the militia, probably spoke only to them. It is likely he also rode down to the skirmish line and spoke with the men under Hammond because they included “his” Georgians.68

  Both sides were now on the battlefield. Morgan had his men ready and waiting. Tarleton’s infantry was coming up and halting in a growing column on the Green River Road while he evaluated the situation and decided how he would engage the Americans. But what of the battlefield and the American positions on it? They would dictate how Tarleton and Morgan would fight their battle.

  4: The Stage Is Set

  Morgan . . . selected the ground.

  —Dennis Tramell, pensioner, 10 December 1833

  The battle of Cowpens was a chronological series of intense combat episodes as the British encountered different American positions at Cowpens. The Americans were brilliantly posted, placed in progressively stronger lines on land making outstanding use of their skills, and minimizing British advantages. In the week before Cowpens, Morgan created a logistical trap that isolated and weakened Tarleton’s force. Now, on the battlefield he had chosen, Morgan laid a tactical trap, taking advantage of Tarleton’s aggressiveness and perceptions of how a battle was fought. To understand just what Tarleton’s men faced and to present the American order of battle, initial American positions will be discussed in some detail.

  American tactical units can be placed on the landscape with reasonable accuracy, but the engagement was a dynamic affair. Initial positions locate a unit when fighting started, but every unit moved during the battle, in many cases, to planned secondary positions. Identifying American positions requires a reader to deal with landscape, tactics, and references to officers, units, and locations.

  Just as Morgan inspected the Cowpens road junction, it is necessary to describe the site to understand the physical setting. Modern landscape features may not resemble those impressed into a pensioner’s memory on 17 January 1781. Fortunately, several accounts refer to landforms that survive. These generate a framework into which details can be placed by referring to where participants stood. It is possible to create a fairly accurate impression using the existing site, eyewitness accounts, and observations made after the battle.

  Morgan’s dispositions were dictated by the ground and his assessment of how best to use his men. The 1781 landscape can be reconstructed from contemporary accounts and soil maps. Although agriculture, residential housing, and reforestation altered some perspectives, landmarks are still recognizable. Morgan went to Cowpens because it was a road junction, well known to both American and British forces that assembled there in the past.1

  The Green River Road intersection is at the north end of the Cowpens battlefield. The intersecting road provided access to other river crossings. Broad River’s Island Ford is five miles away to the northeast; Coulter’s Ford across the Pacolet River is five miles to the west. The Green River Road went southeast to the Pacolet and north to the Broad River.

  Green River Road follows the line of least resistance across the battlefield. In 1781, the road was a dirt track, perhaps fifteen feet wide, running through a heavily wooded landscape.2 The road was a major thoroughfare following high ground that minimized elevation changes and stream crossings.3 Today the road follows most of the high ground between the heads of Suck Creek on the east, Cane Creek on the west, and Buck Creek on the northwest. It probably did in the past, too, as these creeks constrict high ground south of the intersection. As one enters Cowpens from the south, the entire field seems to slope slightly down to the right, rising slightly to the front and left.

  Captain Dennis Tramell placed the battlefield “between the branch of horse creek and Suck creek.” Suck Creek borders the battlefield on the east and northeast. Horse Creek’s headwaters are in the angle formed by the Green River Road and Coulter’s Ford Road intersection where Little Buck Creek rises.4 When Benjamin Perry visited Cowpens in the 1830s, he was guided by a veteran of the battle who said “The American Army . . . encamped between the head waters of Suck & a branch of Buck Creek which are not more than two or three hundred yards apart. . . . Morgan drew up his little army on a slight ridge, extending from the head of one of those spring branches to the other.”5 Perry’s veteran identified the American campsite, but the traditional camp location, known to South Carolina Cowpens veterans, was a sheltered valley east of the road. This position is shown on the Hammond Map drawn before the battle and shows Pickens’s Militia well east of the road.

  It is possible the Continentals camped at the actual intersection. The Hammond Map shows Continentals spread across the Green River Road with Triplett’s Virginia militia west of the road. Marylander George Wilson was wounded and left behind, “at the head of Bucks Creek,” the flat ground at the road junction.6

  The Flying Army probably covered all approaches to the crossroad, utilizing available water and open, flat ground. The generally level landscape was not missed by participants who called it “Cowpens plains.” Richard Winn noted Cowpens was “even enough to make race-paths.”7 If lower ground is included, the vertical profile still varies less than forty-five feet. The landscape has not changed very much since Spartanburg historian J. B. O. Landrum wrote, “What has been described by several writers as eminences on the battle field . . . are nothing more than ridges scarcely noticeable. The main road . . . is in fact so level . . . the only rising ground of any note on the whole field is a little eminence a short distance in rear of the ridge, where the main line was formed. This is of sufficient height to cover a man on horseback placed in the rear of it.”8

  Participants identify landforms using terms including “rivulet,” “right ravine,” “left ravine,” and “the swale.” Other features, less prominent and changed si
nce the battle, are a “clump of pines” and the “slope.” These terms originating in veterans’ recollections and historical usage clarify landscape discussion. “Hayes Rise” and “Morgan Hill” are modern terms used to describe key points on the battlefield.

  “Rivulet” was used by local Tory Alexander Chesney to describe the skirmishers’ position where “the Americans were posted behind a rivulet.”9 The feature best fitting the context is an intermittent head of Island Creek. This stream eroded the slope, creating a low, flat bottom in front of McDowell’s position. After winter rains, this low ground was probably a near bog at the time of the battle.

  Militia dragoon Thomas Young reported, “The regulars . . . were formed . . . their right flank resting upon the head of the ravine on the right.” The “right ravine” is probably modern-day Maple Swamp, low, boggy ground creating a “peninsula” of higher ground on the main line’s right flank.10

  Young also reported “the militia[‘s] . . . left flank resting near the head of the ravine on the left.”11 The “left ravine” is the southern head of Suck Creek no. 2. This low ground protected the South Carolina militia line’s left flank. The northern head of this creek catches runoff from the swale and covered Triplett’s Virginia militia’s left flank.

  A third ravine, the west ravine, runs south into the bottom drained by the rivulet. This is straight and shallow, suggesting an old property or fence line. If it were present during the battle, trees and brush along its course would have covered the forward American right flank. This ravine does not extend as far as the main line, but it covered the skirmish and militia line right flanks.

  At the heads of Suck Creek no. 2 and the rivulet were springs that no longer flow. Three springs forming Suck Creek were still flowing north of the Green River Road in 1898, and the area around the springs was usually a bog.12 Springs and bogs were also located west of the road where Little Buck, Maple Swamp, and Island Creeks covered the American right flanks. The springs and streams show American flanks were covered, if only by boggy ground.13