A Devil of a Whipping Page 8

  When Morgan marched from Charlotte, the Flying Army crossed into South Carolina at Biggers Ferry on 22 December, then moved to Grindal Shoals, a well-known Pacolet River crossing. The campsite was secured by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Hayes’s Little River militia the day before Morgan arrived. Continental dragoons arrived the next day.2

  Grindal Shoals was the main Flying Army base until 14 January 1781. The camp was on militant Tory Alexander Chesney’s plantation, on the “east side of the river, on the ridge rising just opposite the island in the river.” During their stay, Morgan’s men plundered Chesney’s property of everything usable, including grain, trees, clothing, and blankets. In his claim to the British government, Chesney swore the Americans took at least 500 bushels of “Indian corn, in store, a quantity of oats and other crops.”3 By camping on a Loyalist’s property, Morgan punished Chesney, intimidated other Tories, and lessened his army’s impact on local patriots.

  Morgan’s whole force did not camp at Grindal Shoals. Detachments camped at Burr’s Mill on Thicketty Creek; dragoons were often at Wofford’s Iron Works on Lawson’s Fork to repair equipment and shoe horses. Pickens and his brigade reported, then moved into the Fair Forest drainage. Around 8 January, militia at Grindal Shoals moved across the Pacolet, partly to delay Tarleton, should he make a sudden attack. Other militia were north of the Broad River obtaining supplies, especially forage.4

  Tarleton’s operations against Morgan began when Cornwallis ordered him to protect Ninety Six on i January 1781. Tarleton was at Brierly’s Ferry on Broad River with “his corps of cavalry and infantry, of five hundred and fifty men, the first battalion of the 71st, consisting of two hundred, and two three-pounders.”5 Cornwallis confirmed on 2 January that “if Morgan is still at William’s, or any where within your reach, I should wish you to push him to the utmost.. . . Ninety-Six is of so much consequence, that no time is to be lost.” Tarleton quickly learned Ninety Six was not in danger. On 4 January, twenty miles from Brierley’s, he halted at Brooke’s Bush River Plantation and requested baggage and additional troops. Just as Morgan supplied his men, Tarleton could not move without sufficient food and forage. The area around Brooke’s had forage, and he anticipated gathering “four days’s flour for a move.”6

  Tarleton also proposed maneuvers to defeat Morgan or drive him away. He wrote Cornwallis that “when I advance, I must either destroy Morgan’s Corps, or push it before me over Broad river, towards King’s mountain. The advance of the army should commence (when your lordship orders this corps to move) onwards for King’s mountain.”7 After Cornwallis sent baggage, dragoons, and the 7th Regiment, Tarleton’s command numbered approximately 1,200 men.8 Tarleton remained at Brooke’s, gathering food and forage, until the baggage and reinforcements arrived. Everything was in place by 11 January; Tarleton had four days’ food supply, his reinforcements and baggage.

  In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel William Washington, Colonel Thomas Brandon, and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Hayes returned to Grindal Shoals about 4 January. On their way to rejoin Morgan after the Hammond’s Store raid, they were joined by Colonel Andrew Pickens and his Long Cane Creek men.9 The South Carolina militia now formed a brigade of four regiments under Pickens. Most of this brigade moved to the Fair Forest drainage near Union. Pickens encamped the South Carolina State Troops around Fair Forest Meeting House on Dinning Creek. Hayes’s Little River Regiment moved onto high ground above Tyger River’s Adams Ford south of Union crossroads. Brandon’s Fair Forest Regiment went to Fair Forest Shoal, where Loyalist Thomas Fletchall had a mill, ensuring a supply of flour.10 The Spartanburg Regiment had two battalions drawn from the area around Grindal Shoals. Colonel John Thomas’s men were already with Morgan; Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Roebuck’s men learned they were being called up. The Americans were now well placed to exploit the region and oppose the British.

  MAP 2.American and British Movements, 12-16 January 1781

  When dragoon replacements and the 7th Regiment reached Tarleton about 8 January, Tarleton was not yet ready to move. By 11 January, Ninety Six was no longer in danger, and Tarleton began operations directly against Morgan. That evening, he camped northwest of Newberry, where he received permission to keep the 7th Regiment. Tarleton continued his advance toward Morgan, crossing Indian and Duncan’s Creeks and heading north toward the Enoree River. About this time, he was joined by Captain Alexander Chesney, the Grindal Shoals Tory who came up from Ninety Six to guide Tarleton in the Pacolet River area.11

  British movements were quickly reported to Morgan, often by several different parties. On 12 January, word came to Pickens that Tarleton was moving rapidly north. Pickens sent the news on to Grindal Shoals, where Morgan issued orders for Washington’s cavalry to rejoin the Flying Army. Immediately after sending word, Pickens started his brigade westward.12 Pickens and his men formed a screen between Morgan and Tarleton while Morgan assembled local militia and shifted units to protect his flanks, the Green River Road escape route, and upper river crossings.

  Tarleton continued advancing. On the 14th, he crossed the Enoree River at Kennedy’s Ford, only about thirty miles from Grindal Shoals. The British crossed the Tyger River at Adam’s Ford, then moved through Union crossroads.13 North of Union, Tarleton marched northwest to threaten Morgan, Wof Ford’s Iron Works, and any westward retreat Morgan might attempt. Since Chesney was traveling with the British, Tarleton had expert advice about roads and river-crossing points. Tarleton already knew the area because he operated against Sumter during the Blackstock’s campaign in November 1780.14 As Tarleton advanced along the Fair Forest drainage, he drove Pickens’s Brigade toward Morgan’s concentrating forces. More important, the British entered an area heavily exploited in the fall of 1780 and by Pickens over the last week. The rapid marching also meant British soldiers had no time to forage farther afield as they moved through an area swept clean by both sides.

  On the 14th, Morgan moved his militia and Continentals to block the Pacolet fords between Grindal and Troft Shoals.15 With Tarleton operating along the main road across the upcountry, Morgan could only retreat north to Broad River.16 Morgan was gradually reinforced by small parties as well as company- and battalion-sized units. The Spartanburg Regiment’s second in command, Benjamin Roebuck, was already at Grindal Shoals with some men, calling up his company commanders. Once a decision was made to fight, they would bring in their men.17

  Not everyone at Grindal Shoals wanted to stay. When their enlistments expired, men wanted to return home. Personal pleas were necessary to keep the army together. Samuel Moore wrote that “Morgan was expecting a reinforcement of fresh troops, who had not yet arrived, and insisted that Capt Whiteside and others, whose time had expired, should not leave him, in his exposed condition, to contend with a handfull of men against a powerful and Victorious enemy. This appeal, which could not be heard with indifference, was not without its effect, and Captain Whiteside and his men remained until after the Battle.”18 Fresh northern reinforcements were coming, including state troops and militia from Virginia and North Carolina.

  Morgan began moving troops toward the Broad River on 14 January and, on 15 January, his Continentals marched to Burr’s Mill, a short distance north of Grindal Shoals. The withdrawal reflected a shrewd strategic assessment. Morgan forced Tarleton to operate where Americans already had taken available provisions, drew him farther from Cornwallis, and moved the Americans closer to supplies and reinforcements. Morgan explained the retreat to the militia and Continentals in terms they would appreciate. Aaron Guyton remembered that Morgan, “hearing of a detachment under Col. Tarlton coming on him and dreading to engage him so near Lord Cornwallis’ army, retreated two days up the Country to a place Called the Cow Pens.” Later, Continental captain Samuel Shaw wrote that Morgan “retreated a considerable distance in order to draw Tarleton from the main body commanded by Cornwallis.”19 The Flying Army grew stronger as detachments came in, but Morgan continued marching northwest, sending units ahead to gather supplies and prot
ect the route.

  Tarleton spent 15 January learning details about the Pacolet fords as his troops marched west, bypassing Grindal Shoals and threatening both Wofford’s Iron Works and the upper Pacolet fords that allowed access to Morgan’s line of retreat. That evening, the British made a show of camping, but they moved immediately after dark.20 South Carolina militia watching the British and guarding the Pacolet fords were deceived by Tarleton’s false night camp. While the Continentals and Virginia militia camped at Burr’s Mill above Thicketty Creek, the British moved downstream after dark, found Easterwood Ford unguarded, and crossed at dawn. Tarleton’s night countermarch paid off. The British were now within six miles of Morgan, but Tarleton’s men lost sleep and put additional miles on their legs.21

  When Morgan learned of the British crossing, he immediately ordered the Continentals north, without finishing breakfast. McDowell’s North Carolina militia remained behind to cover the withdrawal.22 It was noon before British dragoons completed probing the approaches to Burr’s Mill. As British scouts neared the American Burr’s Mill camp, “the militia being on horseback started about 12 O’clock,” to rejoin Morgan.

  Tarleton was wise to conduct a careful reconnaissance. American units were operating between Morgan and the British. South Carolinians James Dillard, Samuel Hammond “and John Greer were sent by General Pickens . . . to reconitre his line of march & to give such notice of the British march as might appear necessary. . . . they . . . run a Tory Colonel near Tarletons line & took a Negroe man & two Horses from him.”23 British dragoons were taken up by the militia as well. South Carolina captain George Gresham reported falling “in with a party of the British advance—we had a skirmish and made two prisoners. We reached the General the evening preceeding the battle of the Cowpens.”24

  The British occupied the American camp late on 16 January. “It yielded a good post, and afforded plenty of provisions, which they had left behind them, half cooked, in every part of their encampment.” A food shortage is suggested in Tarletons comment about the American provisions. The four days already spent pursuing Morgan consumed supplies accumulated earlier at Brooke’s Plantation.25

  While the British camped, Loyalists continued scouting. “Early in the night the pairóles reported that General Morgan had struck into byways, tending towards Thickelle creek.”26 Tarleton rested his men a short time but apparently got no sleep himself, since he continued to interview scouts as they came in during the night.

  Earlier that afternoon, Morgan went ahead and met with local residents before the Flying Army reached Cowpens. Before deciding to fight, he conducted a reconnaissance the afternoon of 16 January. Captain Dennis Tramell recalled that “the Cowpens . . . being in two and a half miles of [his] residence . . . and he being well acquainted with the local Situation of the ground . . . with Geni. Morgan and his life-guard and Aide d camp went out and selected the ground upon which the Battle was fought.”27

  While Tramell escorted Morgan over the old fields, Americans moved toward Cowpens crossroads from all directions. Continentals and Virginia militia arrived in the late afternoon, accompanied by “Georgia volunteers and South Militia, to the number of between two and three hundred.”28 During the remaining daylight and all through the night, units and individual volunteers came into the American camp. Even Virginians arrived at Cowpens the night before the battle, lending credence to John Eager Howard’s recollection “that parties were coming in most of the night, and calling on Morgan for ammunition, and to know the state of affairs. They were all in good spirits, related circumstances of Tarletons cruelty, and expressed the strongest desire to check his progress.”29

  That afternoon, Morgan had not yet made the decision to fight, but he knew a fight was coming. After completing his reconnaissance, Morgan told Captain Tramell they would fight. Once Morgan decided to fight, he committed totally, and Tramell later recalled the statement “of Geni. Morgan . . . ‘Captain here is Morgan’s grave or victory.’ “ Others recalled a similar statement, such as “on this ground I will defeat the British or lay my bones.”30

  Morgan told the militia a fight was coming, perhaps before making a final decision. South Carolina militiaman Thomas Young noted he and others “arrived at. . . Cowpens about sun-down, and were then told that there we should meet the enemy. . . . [M]any a hearty curse had been vented against Gen. Morgan during that day’s march, for retreating, as we thought, to avoid a fight.” The militia attitude was crucial to success. If Morgan crossed the Broad River into North Carolina, he would lose South Carolina militiamen composing more than half his force. When the militia learned “we should meet the enemy[,] the news was received with great joy by the army. We were very anxious for battle.”31

  “Morgan did not decide on action until he was joined in the night by Pickens and his followers,” but a final decision was forced on him by Tarleton’s rapid approach.32 His reasons for fighting at Cowpens were explained to John Marshall “soon after [Morgan’s] return” from the Carolinas. “Morgan had great and just confidence in himself and his troops; he was unwilling to fly from an enemy not so decidedly his superior as to render it madness to fight him; and he also thought that, if he should be overtaken while his men were fatigued and retreating, the probability of success would be much less than if he should exhibit the appearance of fighting from choice.”33

  The decision made, Morgan briefed his officers in a council of war, probably after dark. When Morgan informed subordinates of his decision, Washington allegedly said, “No burning, no flying: but face about and give battle to the enemy, and acquit ourselves like men in defence of their baggage, their lives, and the interests of the Country.”34

  Today, it is called an operations order, but veterans simply recalled an order. Morgan’s instructions were first issued to unit commanders on the scene if they had to fight. Later, as other officers arrived, they, too, were briefed about their roles but apparently given only partial views of the whole plan. Each unit “took up Camp all in order for Battle.” Only one officer made a record of Morgan’s briefing. When Samuel Hammond came in about 8:00 P.M., he was informed of his duties “in case of coming to action.”35 Morgan also issued a password and countersign. “The watchword was . . . ‘Who are you?’ Answer: ‘Fire.’ Reply, ‘Sword.’ So the word was fire and sword. By this we were to know our friends from foes.” Unlike other southern battles, no militiamen recalled putting sprigs of green in their hats.36

  The veteran Continentals had seen battle and had scores to settle for Camden and British treatment of American prisoners. Delaware private Henry Wells was particularly bitter as he recalled, “two of my Cosins fell into the hands of the enemy at Camden, and died from the Severity of their treatment—the other lived to be exchanged, but he returned with a Shattered Constitution.”37 Wallace’s Virginia Continentals had no false illusions either. Several were survivors of Waxhaws and bore scars from Tarle-ton’s sabers and bayonets.38

  The militia needed encouragement. Howard recalled “Morgan was careful to address the officers and men, inspire confidence in them.” Militiaman Thomas Young was even more impressed.

  It was upon this occasion I was more perfectly convinced of Gen. Morgans’s qualifications to command militia, than I had ever before been. He went among the volunteers, helped them fix their swords, joked with them about their sweet-hearts, told them to keep in good spirits, and the day would be ours. And long after I laid down, he was going about among the soldiers encouraging them, and telling them that the old wagoner would crack his whip over Ben. [Tarlton] in the morning, as sure as they lived. ‘Just hold up your heads, boys, three fires,’ he would say, ‘and you are free, and then when you return to your homes, how the old folks will bless you, and the girls kiss you, for your gallant conduct!’ I don’t believe he slept a wink that night!39

  Morgan appealed to their bravery and home ties, but kept his demands within practical limits. He mentioned competition between Georgians and Carolinians but asked for only three shots before
withdrawing. Once they completed firing, the militia had well-defined routes to the protection of Continental bayonets. Everything was presented in basic terms the men could understand.40

  Morgan also fed his men. The Americans had food because cattle were driven to the Cowpens earlier that day. Perhaps a battle was not thought so imminent because Reuben Long, one of the drovers, was discharged early on 16 January. Cattle were butchered that night by James Turner and others.41 Subsistence taken care of, Morgan dealt with another logistical problem. “Orders had been issued to the militia, to have twenty-four rounds of balls prepared and ready for use, before they retired.”42 Continental cartridge boxes generally held about twenty-four rounds, with another sixteen rounds per man in ammunition wagons. The men were issued the extra ammunition when battle was imminent.43

  By stipulating the number of bullets a man carried, Morgan knew how long a unit could keep firing and when it should be ordered to the rear before running out of ammunition. Envisioning a sequence of linear fire-fights as he drew the British forward and shot them up, Morgan would evaluate British and American fighting capabilities as the battle progressed. Morgan could shift units before they ran out of ammunition. Men could be withdrawn while still possessing ammunition for self-defense and psychological security, reducing chances of a rout.

  As men came in, they were formed into more easily controlled units. Smaller “companies” were amalgamated into larger companies within their own battalions. While consolidation improved control, it would not affect men who remained under their original officers. The officers, however, might not be initiating orders, since they were integrated into a larger formation, with additional levels in the chain of command.