A Devil of a Whipping Read online

  Left of Hayes’s Little River Regiment was Colonel Thomas Brandon’s Fair Forest Regiment from modern Union County. Brandon was assisted by Lieutenant Colonel William Farr, but it is doubtful if the Fair Forest men deployed in two battalions as the men from Spartanburg did. A subjective arrangement of Brandon’s companies is based on seniority and casualties. From right to left, the companies were commanded by Captains Robert Anderson, Robert Montgomery, John Thompson, and William Grant Sr. Lieutenant Joseph Hughes commanded senior captain Benjamin Jolly’s company. As a junior officer, Hughes should have been on the left, but as commander of the senior company he was probably on the right. A company of men from Chester and Fairfield districts commanded by John Moffet was placed on the left flank.43

  To Hayes’s right, west of the road, was the Spartanburg Regiment under Colonel John Thomas Jr. Thomas, the regimental colonel, had battalion duty for January. Since the battle was in Spartanburg District, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Roebuck’s Battalion was called up for the emergency. It was on the right, where Captain Dennis Tramell’s company was located on the extreme right flank. To Tramell’s left were companies commanded by Captain George Roebuck, Benjamin’s brother, and Captain Major Parson. Thomas placed his battalion with its left flank at the Green River Road. The placement of companies had Captains Andrew Barry, John Collins, Thomas Farrow, and John Files Sr. from right to left.44

  As the militia infantry settled in, the skirmishers moved forward, and then Hayes advanced his Little River Regiment.45 Before the British came within range of the militia line’s rifles, Hayes moved back and took position between Brandon and Thomas.46 Morgan’s battle plan called for the skirmishers to fall back and reinforce the militia line on both flanks when the British advanced.47 Between the militia battalions were gaps where some skirmishers would take position. At least two of McDowell’s companies took position outside Tramell’s Company on the right flank; the Burke County Company and the Surry/Wilkes Company. Hammond’s skirmishers took a position between Brandon and the left ravine. Both groups of skirmishers would conduct fighting withdrawals to the main line’s flanks.

  The main line of American resistance was created with men Morgan had commanded since October. They included five Continental companies, Triplett’s Virginia militia, a company of Virginia State Troops, a detachment of North Carolina State Troops, and about twenty-five Burke County militiamen. Many accounts refer to the main line as the second line and its men as light infantry. “The light infantry commanded by Lt.-Col. Howard, and the Virginia Militia under Major Triplett, were formed on a rising ground.”48

  Thomas Young, sitting with the dragoons on Morgan Hill, could see the entire main line. “The regulars, under the command of Col. Howard, a very brave man, were formed in two ranks, their right flank resting upon the head of the ravine on the right.”49 The main line did not extend as far west as the northern head of Maple Swamp, but McDowell’s North Carolina skirmishers withdrew into this gap as the battle reached its climax. With the northern head of Suck Creek no. 2 on the left, the main line was covered on both flanks by wet, boggy ground covered with cane, and by skirmishers.

  On the right flank, four companies were drawn up as a temporary battalion possibly under the command of Captain Edmund Tate (Tait).50 From right to left, these companies were the North Carolina State Troops under Captain Henry Connelly,51 Virginia Continentals under Captain Andrew Wallace, Virginia State Troops under Captain John Lawson, and Augusta County, Virginia, riflemen under Captain Patrick Buchanan.52

  The center was a solid block of experienced, battle-tested Continentals. Here four, sixty-man Continental companies took up a space 240 feet wide with little or no space between platoons or companies.53 The companies were under Captain Richard Anderson, Lieutenant Nicholas Mangers, Captain Robert Kirkwood, and Captain Henry Dobson.

  To Dobson’s left was Major Francis Triplett’s Virginia battalion with companies under Captains John Combs, James Tate (Tait),54 and James Gilmore, as well as a company of Burke County, North Carolina, militia probably commanded by a man named Beatty.55 Combs’s Company’s right flank was in the Green River Road because First Sergeant Benjamin Martin stated he “was in the Road all the time of the actions I covered Captain Combs . . . Captain Dobson and Lieutenant Ewen was on the left of the Maryland Troops neare me.”56

  The Continental companies numbered sixty men each. Triplett’s left-flank Virginia militia companies were smaller, averaging about forty-five men each. If Buchanan and Lawson were augmented by Campbell’s militia just before the battle, their units numbered at least sixty, and probably seventy-five men each. The two flanking North Carolina companies were much smaller. Burke County men with Triplett on the left numbered about twenty-five; the North Carolina State Troops under Connelly probably numbered about the same.

  The 600 men in this line covered a front of 200 yards if they were tightly aligned. This is not quite enough to cover the 250 yards between Suck Creek and Maple Swamp, so there was space for the British dragoons to operate. While the flanks were “covered,” they were not fully secured until militia skirmishers fell back and filled the gaps between main-line flanks and wet ground.

  Morgan’s early-evening orders show the main line with gaps between the central core of Continentals and the Virginians to either side of them.57 While Hammond erred in his use of left and right, he did describe the flank battalions as stepped back, en échelon, to the center. This was an innovative tactical arrangement that allowed gaps through which militia could pass. Morgan was not willing to have his Continentals and Virginians buffeted and disrupted by withdrawing militia.

  This unusual and potentially dangerous formation is supported by two British accounts. Scottish historian David Stewart, drawing information from 71st Regiment participants, reported the main line “suddenly faced to the right, and inclined backwards; a manoeuvre by which a space was left for the front line to retreat, without interfering with the ranks.” The other account claims the main line “opened to the right and left.” One of Combs’s Virginians agrees, saying “the rifle men [South Carolina militia] were to fire and pass [through?] breaks in the Centre and fall off to the right and flank of the Musquet Line.”58 This shift let the militia through. Morgan created a buffer behind his main battle line. The en échelon Virginians created lanes for the militia to withdraw but also channeled the militia, so Morgan could reform them behind the main line. Morgan probably stationed himself and his aides in the funnel mouth once the militia began to fall back. They helped reorganize those South Carolinians heading for safety. Once the militia passed through, the Virginians moved forward to create a solid line.59

  Details of Morgan’s tactical plan have not been appreciated because most writers omit discussion of his sophisticated, unconventional, main-line deployment, as well as the reverse slope defense.60 Morgan provided for the main line to withdraw if pressed too hard. “The orders to the second line were, not to be alarmed at the retreat of the militia, to fire low and deliberately, not to break on any account, and if forced to retire, to rally on the eminence in their rear, where they were assured the enemy could not injure them.”61

  Mounted Americans lined up across the Green River Road with “Washington and his men on the wing.”62 “The Third Regiment of Dragoons . . . were so posted in the rear as not to be injured by the enemy’s fire, and yet to be able to charge them should an occasion offer.” Morgan provided few details about the initial dragoon positions; others were more precise. The cavalry “was formed in the rear of the hollow way [the swale] behind an eminence [Morgan Hill].”63 Thomas Young, a volunteer dragoon, remembered “the cavalry formed in rear of the center, or rather in rear of the left wing of the regulars.”64 This location placed them behind Kirkwood and Dobson.

  The probable arrangement of cavalry units was each troop in column facing south across the swale. This formation allowed rapid deployment to either flank or front. It is likely that Young, in Jolly’s Company of forty-five militia volunteers, was
on the extreme left. The next unit to the right was a composite troop of Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina state dragoons under Major McCall, numbering about fifty men. On the right were eighty-two troopers of the 3rd Continental Light Dragoons under Washington. The three troops of the Third Dragoons were arranged by seniority, from left to right under Captains William Parsons, Churchill Jones, and William Barrett and Major James Call.

  When British artillery shot began falling among his troopers, Washington moved them out of the beaten zone.65 This might be the only direct effect of artillery during the battle. The new cavalry position was a draw northwest of Morgan Hill. It was deep enough to shelter cavalry but close enough to support the infantry.

  Morgan initially placed Washington’s dragoons as a rallying point, and to counterattack the British. The disposition shows how cleverly Morgan used his cavalry as a reserve and still provided for additional flank coverage. The dragoons served to block fleeing militia, keeping them from running to the rear, but they were close enough to move against any British flanking threat.

  The militia horses were tied up east of Morgan Hill. Howard recalled “the militia all rode to the ground and their horses were tied in the woods in the rear of my left flank.” The distance was remembered by Henry Connelly, whose horses were “tied about four hundred paces in the rear of the line of Battle.”66

  Morgan sent off his baggage before the battle. The baggage train’s location is unknown, but most accounts suggest it was moving up the Island Ford Road. Since the baggage had only thirty minutes to move, it is likely they were less than halfway to the ford, five miles away. One account said the baggage was six miles away, but if the distance is accurate, Morgan’s baggage was north of Broad River, and the account probably refers to a time after the battle.67

  In some ways, Morgan’s battle plan was a microcosm of Greene’s statement that “We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again.”68 Each American line would fight, withdraw, rally, and fight again as the battle progressed. While proof of Morgan’s tactical abilities can be seen in his victory, an assessment rendered by a British military man noted, “The dispositions made by the enemy on this occasion appear to have been judicious.”69

  How judicious they were can be seen by what happened when the British arrived and found the Americans ready for battle. As the Americans waited, some noted weather and other environmental conditions. Participants who mentioned the weather referred to it being a cold and very raw day.70 Average temperatures from Spartanburg suggest it may have been well below freezing that morning. Initially, the cold may have adversely affected the Americans more than the British. Tarleton’s men were warmed up by their exertions; the Americans were standing in wet grass after having moved less than a half mile following a chilling night in the open.

  Hugh Allison, a South Carolina militiaman across the Broad River in North Carolina, mentioned seeing two suns in the sky that morning.71 The atmospheric diffraction resulting in the appearance of two suns is caused by moisture in the air and indicates very high humidity. Not only was it cold, but it was also damp, or, as Captain Connelly reported, “inclined to be rainey.” Atmospheric conditions could affect the battle in other ways. Dampness made it difficult for flintlocks to fire or to ignite rapidly, affecting accuracy. Another effect is that vision was different, especially before sunrise. Low clouds or mist affected any assessment of troop dispositions, even after full daylight. Combined with ground cover and elevation, mist may have blocked Tarleton’s ability to see the Continentals waiting on the main line, even if he rode to his right to see around Hayes Rise. Moisture in the air could also affect individual soldiers trying to sight on their targets.

  High humidity would cause gunsmoke to stay along the battle lines, but participants well to the rear reported being able to see the British advancing and no eyewitness recalled clouds of smoke.72 Given the high humidity, a lack of references to gunsmoke suggests wind blew it away and also made the cold and damp worse because of wind chill.

  Adding to Tarleton’s problems with ground cover and the atmosphere, Americans on the first two lines had been told “to ease their joints.”73 This casual order allowed men to get down out of the wind, which further concealed them. It is unlikely Continentals would get such an order, but they were masked by heavier tree cover and the bulk of militia ridge. Trees may have broken the wind, but humidity and rain would keep up a steady dripping and add to the discomfort of men in ranks. It would have been colder under the trees because sunlight would not reach there.

  Morgan’s preparations throughout the night were not in vain. His men were fed and rested. They were on ground of his choosing, in line of battle, and they knew what was expected. Morgan was “in a popular and forcible style of elocution haranguing them.”74

  5: The skirmish Line

  They intended to eat us up.

  —Daniel Morgan to William Snickers, 23 January 1781

  The first infantry Tarleton encountered were skirmishers, riflemen from Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. Approximately 150 yards in front of the militia line, they engaged the advancing British, forced their deployment, and started the attriting process.1 Casualties inflicted by the skirmishers were probably minor, but they played a key role in wearing down the British in terms of physical stamina and mental desire to win, rather than survive.

  British dragoon captain Richard Hovenden probably heard drums, commands, and the rattling of accoutrements as men shifted into position long before he saw any Americans in the gray light before sunrise. As “commanding officer in front [he] reported that the American troops were halted and forming.” “We were all awakened, ordered under arms, and formed in order of battle by daybreak. About sunrise . . . the enemy came in full view.”2

  The skirmishers first took positions in the militia line but, as Burke County privates Richard Crabtree and James McDonald said, were then “ordered out to meet General Tarlton, and bring on the action.” Few instructions were given the skirmishers, but they had “orders to feel the enemy as he approached.” Most had extensive frontier service and knew generally what to do, but John Baldwin recalled McDowell still “told his men to take aim when they fired.”3 The skirmishers were ordered “not to deliver their fire until the enemy was within fifty yards.”4

  Tarleton lost little time in learning the terrain. Local Tories, including Alexander Chesney, “were immediately consulted relative to the ground which General Morgan then occupied, and the country in his rear. . . . The woods were open and free from swamps; that . . . part of Broad river . . . was about six miles distant.”5 In the gloomy light before daybreak, Tarleton could not see much. Hayes and his men were visible, still positioned on the highest ground behind the skirmishers, but Tarleton could not see the militia line’s center or right flank, even if he stood in his stirrups. The militia’s left flank would be partially visible as the sun rose but was obscured by scattered trees. Its precise location was masked by Hammond’s skirmishers. While he could see militia, he could not see the Continentals deeper in the shadows and behind heavier tree cover well to the rear behind the ridge.6

  Morgan’s trap depended on breaking down the British, and, if Tarleton could not see the American lines, the later appearance of new, stronger lines would come as something of a surprise. The skirmishers huddled in a long, sweeping line of little groups as far as he could see across the front did not look particularly impressive. Hayes’s line did not extend far on either side of the road and did not pose any real obstacle either. It might well be these men were only a rear guard to delay the British long enough for the Americans to cross the Broad River.

  Private James Collins had a good view from his position on Brandon’s left as, “about sunrise . . . the enemy came in full view. The sight, to me at least, seemed somewhat imposing; they halted for a short time. We look’d at each other for a considerable time.” Some delay occurred as the British dropped excess equipment and formed a battle line. Delaware’s Lieutenant Anderson noted the
British “halted and Form’d the Line in Full View as We had no artillery to annoy them.”7

  Tarleton needed more information to precisely evaluate the force opposing him. To learn how the Americans were positioned, Tarleton “ordered the legion dragoons to drive in the militia parties who covered the front, that General Morgan’s disposition might be conveniently and distinctly inspected.”8 Secondary accounts report that the British cavalry charged onto the field and drew fire from skirmish-line rifles.9

  The dragoons assaulted the skirmish line center and left because wet low ground on the American right precluded mounted operations west of the road.10 Tarleton’s cavalry rode forward and then turned right, galloping along the American line in front of the slightly higher ground where the skirmishers were posted. The skirmishers knew how to deal with this threat. “The custom of militia warfare, was to get behind trees where they could shelter their bodies and fire from the side; general Morgan ordered them to adopt this mode, and when charged by the enemy’s cavalry, that two should hold their fire in reserve.”11 “The American advanced corps, under Cunningham and M’Dowell, opened their fire and supported it with animation.”12 The bright sparkling flashes from skirmishers’ rifles revealed the American left’s forward positions from Cunningham’s Georgians, around to Joseph Pickens’s South Carolina State Troops.

  MAP 9.The Skirmish Line

  The dragoons failed in their mission to drive off the skirmishers so Tarleton could see how the Americans were posted; their failure is an indication of the skirmish line’s strength and the determination of those manning it. While some did start drifting to the rear, the skirmishers accomplished two missions by forcing Tarleton to deploy and denying him information. The “parties under Cunningham and M’Dowell prevented his approaching near enough to distinguish satisfactorily the American order of battle.”13