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  MAP 3.Topography of the Cowpens Battlefield

  The watercourses were almost certainly covered with stands of cane in 1781. The best-known statement about flank coverage dates to 1898, when a Confederate veteran pointed out that the springs made “a flank movement of cavalry or artillery difficult, if not impossible.”14 Morgan’s men were difficult to outflank because of these bogs and springs, especially since it had been raining intermittently for several days before the battle.15

  “Rising ground” was used by participants to describe slight changes in elevation. The most distinctive change in elevation is north of the rivulet. The change is over twenty vertical feet in less than fifty yards. McDowell placed his skirmishers along a terrace west of the road. This terrace is less distinctive as it curves gently southward east of Green River Road, but this slight elevation still provides a vantage point from which Hammond’s Georgia and South Carolina skirmishers directed fire against the British right in the opening phase of the battle.

  Militia ridge is a second “rising ground,” the “first ridge” mentioned in some accounts. The ridge is highest about seventy-five yards north of the rivulet. As Green River Road proceeds north past the terrace above the rivulet, the land rises about another ten to fifteen feet. The highest point is at the road, where the rise is now emphasized by the old road grade. The northern slope of this ridge is where South Carolina militia battalions were positioned.16 The high central point at the road is Hayes Rise, a modern term describing the highest point on the ridge.17 It ends as the ridge slopes east down to more level ground. To the west, the ground rises slightly toward the west ravine.

  In a very explicit context, rising ground means the edge of militia ridge where the slope rises up from the swale. Howard placed his Continentals on a slight terrace here. Today this terrace above the swale’s southern edge is not very pronounced. In the past, before erosion filled the swale, it was significant enough to be shown on one 1781 map.18

  The “swale” refers to low ground between the main line and Morgan Hill. It is a drainage basin running into Suck Creek no. 2’s northern head. Since 1781, erosion has filled in and leveled the swale, which is now slightly higher and dryer. William Johnson described this area in 1822 and pointed out that “the ground, after descending a few yards [the swale], rose into another eminence sufficient in height to cover a man on horseback.”19 The swale was open with scattered pine trees.20

  “Morgan Hill” is the second “eminence” mentioned by Johnson. From its south slope, the entire battlefield is visible, except for dead space southwest of Hayes Rise. During the militia withdrawal, Morgan may have been on the forward slope of this hill with his aides, guiding the militia into the left rear. Washington and his troopers initially took position on Morgan Hill next to where the Green River Road curves northeast. Behind Morgan Hill is the head of Cudd’s (or Little Buck) Creek, a lower area protected from direct fire where the dragoons took refuge from artillery fire early in the battle.

  Two other reference points have changed since 1781. The “clump of pines” and the “slope” both relate to an area where militiamen secured their horses.21 Contemporary accounts suggest a clump of young pines adjacent to a slope, large enough to contain at least 400 horses. The exact site is generally known but not pinpointed. North Carolina captain Connelly remembered, “our horses which was tied about four hundred paces in the rear of the line of Battle.”22

  All sources agree the battlefield was partially open with “not one single bush on the field of battle to entangle the troops.” Participants suggest certain areas had thicker tree cover than others. Based on their accounts, the skirmish line was located in old fields growing back with pine saplings, but the ground was still relatively open back to the militia line.

  The militia took a position before, at, and in a tree line, downslope from the crest of militia ridge. Today this position runs along the scar of an old road perpendicular to the Green River Road. Behind the militia line, tree cover was thicker. Main-line veterans say the fighting was in pine woods, and they generally indicate sunrise somewhat later than men in the two forward lines, another indicator of heavier tree cover.23

  There are three reasons for a lack of undergrowth. The area may have been burned over to get rid of vermin and to encourage better growth of cattle forage. Animals grazing through the woods would tend to keep brush down as well. Military forces camped here during the Kings Mountain campaign, and many smaller units repeatedly used it as a camping ground. These men would have stripped the brush and trees of limbs for firewood as high as they could reach. Probably all three activities cleared the Cowpens of undergrowth.

  Maps show few landscape details but do show approximate unit locations; however, they are confusing and, until recently, only one contemporary map was known. Two additional maps were located in 1992. The newer maps follow Morgan’s report of the battle.24

  The best-known map is by South Carolina captain Samuel Hammond. Hammond shows positions for “troops, in case of coming to action [emphasis added].” Hammond prepared it to orient his men on the skirmish line.25 Hammond’s “First View” shows two different American arrangements. The original deployment has a “main guard,” or camp, to the north and Triplett’s Virginia militia to the west of Howard’s Continentals. Pickens is east of Howard. This appears to be the formation in which the Americans camped.26 He further shows these units with more commanders in positions they were intended to occupy if a fight occurred. These are slightly south of the initial positions involved with camping in order for battle. Since he shows an eastward-running “valley or ravine” in front of the riflemen, this entire deployment is placed on Morgan Hill overlooking the swale.

  John Eager Howard; oil painting by Charles Willson Peale (Independence National Historical Park Collection)

  MAP 4.The Hammond Map—First View

  Source: Samuel Hammond’s “Notes,” in Joseph Johnson,

  Traditions and Reminiscences, 529.

  MAP 5.The Hammond Map—Second View

  Source: Samuel Hammond’s “Notes,” in Joseph Johnson,

  Traditions and Reminiscences, 530.

  Text accompanying Hammond’s map is confusing, but the internal problems are the key to understanding Hammond and his map. If the arrow indicates north, Hammond was turned 180 degrees as it actually points to magnetic south. The “valley” running toward the American right cannot be the rivulet and must be the swale. In his written description, Hammond was oriented as if he were facing north, perhaps because he briefed his men so they could face down the Green River Road. The map has the same orientation. Thus, Hammond’s “left” is the American military right, or west.

  Hammond’s “second view” shows American positions after the militia retreated behind the Continentals and, to some extent, after the Continental withdrawal. He has Triplett’s Virginians west of Howard in their “second position,” suggesting Triplett moved his battalion around behind the Continentals when the bayonet charge took place in the swale. This second view is more a presentation of the units’ final positions, as will be seen in coming chapters.

  MAP 6.The “CloveMap”

  Source: National Archives.

  The two other maps are by the same hand. One, the “Clove Map,” reflects a generalized interpretation of Morgan’s formal report. It follows Morgan’s description of his deployment and agrees in many respects with Hammond’s “first view.” Again, this is most likely the positioning in case they had to fight.

  The “Pigree Map” is more detailed, as it shows unit movements during the battle.27 The Pigree Map shows later skirmisher positions on the militia-line flanks, but unit locations err in that Hayes is shown on the left flank when he was actually on the Green River Road. Brandon is shown on the right flank when he held the left. McDowell is shown in a central position when he was on the militia-line right flank. This is an adaptation of the Clove Map and Morgan’s battle report which the cartographer apparently used to draw these maps, but it refl
ects unit movements as they occurred as if the starting points were the initial, early evening stations, not their battle positions.

  The situation, in terms of men and their tactical disposition, changed between dark on 16 January and dawn, 17 January. Morgan changed his deployment from positions in case they were attacked to an alignment for a battle he would fight.28 The difference is shown by Hammond, who places the same Americans in the two different locations in Map 4. This shift is crucial to understanding the maps and pension accounts. The battle, as fought, reflects Morgan’s response to the numbers of men who came in during the night.

  Howard later recalled militia coming in all night. One Virginia militia company, and possibly some Virginia State Troops, came in the morning before the battle. At least 100 South Carolina militiamen under Irby and Sexton came the night of 16-17 January. Pickens and at least 150 men came in after Morgan had briefed Hammond about 8:00 P.M.29

  MAP 7.The “PigreeMap”

  Source: National Archives.

  Morgan thought Tarleton would depend on a straightforward charge and initially laid a trap for the British if they should attack him in the night. All three prebattle maps show rifle-armed militia on the wings and slightly forward of the Continentals and Virginians situated across the Green River Road north of the swale. If Tarleton attacked, the British would run a gauntlet that would turn into a double envelopment as they closed with the Continentals blocking the road.

  Later that night, Morgan had the manpower to create a defense in depth. Instead of drawing the British into a zone of flanking fire that would both constrict and concentrate them for the Continental volleys, Morgan deployed progressively stronger infantry lines to shoot up the British as they advanced. Damaging the British infantry was a key factor in evening the odds against the Continentals when they engaged Tarleton’s infantry.

  Initial American positions are derived from analyses of participant and contemporary documents of both sides, Morgan’s order, and maps. Pension accounts, in particular, provide keys to understanding how Morgan deployed on 17 January 1781 because they mention landforms. Many positions differ from those enumerated by Morgan and Hammond in the preliminary instructions given early on 16 January. Where these differences occur, endnotes will support changes from Morgan’s account and the maps.

  Locating larger militia units and Continentals on the landscape is not especially difficult; the same cannot be said for company-level militia organizations. In some cases, officers are incorrectly identified due to misspelled names, assignment to the wrong state, or to a position on the left instead of the right. There are also questions about officer rank held at Cowpens. A final problem exists when two or three men had the same first and last name.

  Morgan’s plan envisioned a defense in depth, consisting of three linear positions, skirmishers, militia, and Continentals. Ahead of the battle lines, he posted pickets, or videttes. Behind his main-line Continentals, he placed cavalry as a reserve. As soon as Morgan learned Tarleton was nearby, he sent his baggage away up the Island Ford Road.

  Outlying American pickets “stationed three miles in advance” were “peculiarly serviceable to you in advertising you of the Enemies approach and skirmishing with their advance.” The picket post was composed of both Continental Dragoons under Lieutenant Leonard Anderson and Georgia militia under Captain Joshua Inman.30

  About three miles behind the videttes, skirmishers deployed across the southern end of the battlefield less than 150 yards in front of Pickens’s militia. The right flank was on a commanding rise above the rivulet, protected by soggy ground to its front and a tangle of brush on the right around the ravine. On the left, east of the road, the rise was neither so pronounced nor as well protected. Here, the rise curved forward to create an arena in which the British would deploy.

  The skirmishers would force the British to deploy and then fight a delaying action, causing British casualties, as they withdrew. Accounts referring to the militia as the first line indicate many participants recognized the skirmishers as a delaying force, suggesting they were not deployed across the field as significant opposition. It is unlikely the skirmishers lined up in a formal battle line but were, instead, scattered in loose clumps of neighbors under their officers.31

  Samuel Hammond reported two battalions of skirmishers. “Major McDowal, of the North Carolina Volunteers . . . on the right flank . . .[,] Major Cunningham, of the Georgia Volunteers, on the left.” To Cunningham’s left was “part of Colonel McCall’s regiment of South-Carolina state troops . . . under the command of Major Hammond.” These men were all “armed with Rifles.”32

  The North Carolina militia, arranged in five or six companies under county captains, was “orderd out to meet General Tarleton & bring on the action.”33 From right to left, the North Carolina companies were from Burke County, a combined Surry and Wilkes Counties unit, another combined company from Rutherford and Lincoln Counties, a combined northern counties company, and, with their left flank on the road, a Rowan County company.34

  Sometime in the night, Hammond was given command of the entire left front. The Georgia skirmishers formed three small companies under Major Cunningham. The South Carolina State Troops farther left had about sixty men under Captain Joseph Pickens and Captain Beal.35

  Private Robert Long described the initial positioning and movement of Hayes’s Little River Regiment. While the militia line assembled, the Little River Battalion was “already formed across the road.” Hayes then moved “70 or 80 yards in advance; Major McDowell, of North Carolina, in advance of us 70 or 80 yards, and Major Triplet, of Virginia, in our rear.” The forward movement was a mistake, as “Hayes’ regiment having advanced too far were to retreat and form on our old ground.”36 A mistake it might have been, but the forward movement accomplished two things. First, it created a rallying point for the skirmishers on the military crest of the ridge, halfway between the skirmish line and the militia line. It also created a gap in the militia line through which skirmishers could retreat.

  Even if Hayes took his forward position in error, Morgan’s plan involved a reverse slope defense,37 behind the high ground. Morgan, a rifleman himself, was aware of “overshooting.” He probably knew the British fired high. A reverse slope defense forced the British to shoot downhill to accentuate the British tendency to shoot high while the lightening sky would silhouette British soldiers against the skyline.

  Another possible reason for placing Pickens’s militia on the reverse slope relates to flank protection. There is no ravine on either flank of the military crest. There are ravines on both flanks if the militia line ran about seventy yards behind Hayes Rise where Suck Creek no. 2 and Maple Swamp run away from the militia-line position. The boggy ground covered with cane made it difficult for Tarleton’s dragoons to operate. Morgan’s defensive plan covered both flanks because skirmishers filled gaps between militia and creeks after withdrawing from more forward positions.

  When Morgan deployed the militia line, he initially put “Colonels Brannon [sic] and Thomas, of the South Carolina Volunteers, on the right of Major McDowal, and Colonels Hays and McCall of the same corps to the left of Major Cunningham.”38 This was about 8:00 P.M. The plans changed as more men came in and Morgan committed to a fight at Cowpens. As it worked out, Brandon was east of the road, to Hayes’s left; Thomas and Roebuck commanded the Spartanburg Militia west of the road, with Roebuck on the flank.

  MAP 8.Hayes’s Battalion Movements

  These four battalions, Roebuck, Thomas, Hayes, and Brandon, formed the militia line’s central core, described in most accounts as the first line. They were probably drawn up in a loosely organized linear formation. The left end was anchored on Suck Creek no. 2, where Hammond’s skirmishers filled the gap between Brandon’s left and the boggy canebrake around the creek’s head.39 On the west, open space between Maple Swamp and the right flank was filled by McDowell’s skirmishers.

  This battalion placement does not agree with Morgan’s battle report or with the
three maps. However, if Morgan used his initial plan to organize his report, without incorporating the later changes, the numerous individual accounts would make sense. Morgan was very busy during the night spiriting up the militia and explaining their roles. Participant accounts uniformly place Brandon east of the road and Thomas and Roebuck to the west. Long places Hayes’s right company in the road, giving a weight of evidence to a different battle deployment than that drawn up on 16 January.

  On the morning of 17 January, the militia aligned on Hayes’s Battalion in the road. Then Hammond, Cunningham, and McDowell moved forward and formed the skirmish line. Again, Private Long provides the best account: “[The] infantry marched out in sections, and divided two and two as they got ten paces of Hayes’ regiment already formed across the road . . . Cols. Thomas and Roebuck in the extreme right. The left wing was similarly formed of militia.” Long amplified this by noting he “was in the centre line on the right wing in Captain Ewing’s company.”40

  Hayes’s Little River Battalion formed the left center of the militia line on the road. Given Long’s statement about Ewing’s company on the right flank, and the seniority of other captains under Hayes, a reasonable accounting of company locations can be presented. Ewing, the senior captain, was in the road. In the consolidated units, Dillard’s company became the left, or second, platoon under Ewing.41 Based on seniority, the next company was under William Harris. Finally, the two left companies were commanded by junior captains Sexton and Irby. Thus, the Little River Battalion companies were posted from right to left: Ewing, Harris, Sexton, Irby.42