A Devil of a Whipping Page 4

  Bayonets could not be used on Revolutionary War rifles. Since rifles were individually manufactured, they were not standardized as to outside barrel diameter and mass-produced bayonets would not fit them. Many Virginia and Carolina rifle barrels were slightly expanded at the muzzle. This “swamping” made it impossible to mount a socket bayonet. A plug bayonet could not be inserted into the barrel because it would damage the rifling and, once in place, the gun could not be fired. Finally, the rifle’s sight was not designed to lock a bayonet in place and would be damaged by the bayonet socket.

  Riflemen solved the lack of a bayonet by carrying other blade weapons, the tomahawk and knife. Virginia private Christian Peters was a rifleman, “in all of which service he carried his own Rifle Tomahawk 8c Butcher knife.”22 There was no universal pattern to the “rifleman’s knife,” which ranged in blade length from about six inches to a foot. They were mounted with iron, brass, pewter, or silver with a grip of wood, horn, bone, or antler. The tomahawk was a light axe that served a variety of functions.23

  Finally, another infantry weapon was the spontoon. Basically a spear, in eighteenth-century armies it signified officer rank. British officers carried spontoons into battle at Hobkirk’s Hill, South Carolina, 25 May 1781, so it is likely they were used at Cowpens. At least one spontoon was used by a Maryland officer to polevault onto a British cannon.24

  In the eighteenth century, infantry combat was dictated by the need to best employ muskets and bayonets. When fighting regular infantry, men stood in ranks, standing shoulder to shoulder. Linear formations allowed more men to fire into opposing ranks and to resist a bayonet charge. “By-the-book” linear tactics involved an almost ritual approach as men moved forward in columns, deployed into battle lines, and then advanced to closer range.25 The linear formations could fire more weapons at one time. The long front allowed massive volley fire but had no depth. A drawback to linear formations was a loss of control as they moved over wooded or rough ground, so attacking forces, at the expense of firepower, might form columns instead to penetrate a line.

  The tactical unit during the Revolution was the regiment. Eighteenth-century military personnel used “battalion” and “regiment” interchangeably, especially if a regiment were less than 300 men.26 A regiment was subdivided into eight companies, each commanded by a captain. A company had two platoons commanded by lieutenants, and was further subdivided into squads or messes. Two companies were combined into a division during firing.

  In most cases, an infantry firefight involved one side standing its ground against attackers who sought to drive them away. Volley fire was designed to kill and for its shock effect to demoralize an enemy before a bayonet charge. No volley was more effective than the first. Tactically, the impact of the first volley cannot be underestimated. In eighteenth-century European armies, it was “a precious resource . . . loaded at leisure before the action began, and it was fired from a clean weapon with a sharp flint. When a volley of such rounds was discharged at short range, it was capable of causing a massacre.”27

  FIGURE 2. Battalion Firing Sequence According to the Von Steuben Manual

  After the initial volley, battalions fired by platoon or division. Firing was almost continuous as platoons or divisions fired in planned sequences to ensure some weapons were always loaded. According to the Von Steuben manual, when more than one battalion was present “they are to do it [volley fire] in succession from right to left; but after the first round, the odd battalions fire so soon as the respective battalions on their left begin to shoulder; and the even battalions fire when the respective battalions on their right begin to shoulder.”28

  In the South, tactical movements evolved away from the slow, steady approach march. By January 1781, both sides deployed rapidly, to close with their opposition as quickly as possible, often with sizable gaps between men. The change in tactics was a response to American rifle fire and British artillery. Rapid deployment meant troops moved from a column as quickly as possible to minimize casualties. “Displaying” took several forms depending on whether or not the movement was to the front, right, or left.

  Spacing between infantrymen varied with conditions. American militia usually formed up in loose companies while Continentals stood shoulder to shoulder in two ranks. The British are usually pictured standing shoulder to shoulder, but this is not true for many southern battles where they adopted a wider spacing called open order. The precise meaning of open order is not covered in contemporary manuals. British light infantry in the North employed two forms of open order in 1778 and 1779. “Files by day always loose; usual order n inches; open order arm’s length; extended order from five yards to fifty.” The phrase “always loose” is a close approximation of Tarleton’s phrase “loose manner of forming.” The extended, or open, order allowed greater distances along a regimental front, reduced chances of damage from musket, rifle, and artillery fire, and made it easier to maintain a linear formation moving through wooded areas. However, it weakened unit cohesion if they were only two-men deep.29

  Before the British attacked Georgia in December 1778, Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell ordered standard formations for his units including the 71st Regiment. Two formations show one yard per man; the third is 1.6 yards, gaps between men ranged from almost one foot to five feet. At Camden, South Carolina, 16 August 1780, British infantry deployed in a single rank with five feet between men.30

  Infantry standing on defense could afford to be closely arrayed, but infantry moving through southern woods and overgrown fields needed gaps to pass trees and brush. Attackers could not operate in a column because American riflemen would simply swarm along the flanks and destroy it. The British were forced to use a linear front equal to the length of an American line at their front. Moving forward in open order, the British could compress to provide mutual support or heavier volley fire by platoons or divisions. When officers felt an enemy was sufficiently weakened or disorganized by gunfire, a bayonet charge would drive their opponents off the field.

  In Europe, eighteenth-century armies usually deployed in three lines when on defense. Composed of a main battle line, a secondary line some distance to the rear, and a reserve well to the rear of the second line, the arrangement offered support across the battlefront.31 While Morgan was undoubtedly concerned about his troops’ ability to meet the British on equal terms, the British were not unduly concerned about American tactics. They were concerned about the American rifles they knew had greater accuracy and range that made their fire dangerous at a distance. The British devised tactics to minimize the rifle’s effectiveness and tried them. When facing “riflemen . . . only. I would treat them the same as my friend Colonel Abercrombie. . . . When Morgan’s riflemen came down to Pennsylvania . . . they marched to attack our light infantry. . . . The moment they appeared before him he ordered his troops to charge them with the bayonet; not one man out of four, had time to fire, and those that did had no time given them to load again; the light infantry not only dispersed them instantly but drove them for miles over the country. They never attacked, or even looked at, our light infantry again, without a regular force to support them.”32 Morgan countered these tactics by supporting militia riflemen with Continentals and opting to attack British officers and noncommissioned officers as targets.

  Tarleton’s infantry component was not as well known as his British Legion dragoons. Mounted troops were an essential part of southern warfare during the Revolution. Their importance was summed up by Major George Hanger, Tarleton’s second in command:

  The crackers and militia in those parts of America are all mounted on horse-back, which renders it totally impossible to force them to an engagement with infantry only. When they chuse to fight, they dismount, and fasten their horses to the fences and rails; but if not very confident in the superiority of their numbers, they remain on horseback, give their fire, and retreat, which renders it useless to attack them without cavalry: for though you repulse them, and drive them from the field, you never ca
n improve the advantage.33

  Hanger’s comment demonstrates that the British needed cavalry to cope with American militia. Americans rode to battle and then fought on foot for two reasons. First, most were armed with rifles requiring a steady platform for accuracy. Second, they did not have the weapons—carbines, pistols, and, most important, sabers—to engage the British on equal terms. When equipped with pistols and swords, American mounted men did fight on horseback, and Morgan shrewdly separated those who had sabers from those who did not before fighting Tarleton at Cowpens.

  Regular cavalry were armed with pistols, sabers, and carbines. The British used a standardized weapon in .65 caliber. Lieutenant Colonel William Washington’s Continental Light Dragoons probably carried the standard .67 caliber French carbine at Cowpens.34 Hand guns carried by cavalrymen and some infantry officers were about nine inches in barrel length, although earlier, longer versions are known. The usual British calibers were .62 or .65 and approximately .69 for the French weapons carried by Americans.35 The Americans carried a variety of personal weapons including British and French types.

  Southern militia dragoons rarely carried carbines, and only about one in four had a pistol. Instead, they used rifles, a weapon they knew intimately. “They carried the muzzle in a small boot, fastened beside the right stirrup leather, and the butt ran through the shot bag belt, so that the lock came directly under the right arm. Those who had a pistol, carried it, swung by a strap, about the size, of a bridle rein, on the left side, over the sword.”36 Some leaders did not feel cavalry gunfire was very useful. In an editorial comment, Robert E. Lee noted “the fire of cavalry is at best innocent, especially in quick action . . . [when] the precision and celerity of the evolution, the adroitness of the rider, . . . and the keen edge of the sabre, with fitness of ground and skill in the leader, constitute their vast power so often decisive in the day of battle.”37

  The basic cavalry weapon was the saber, with a blade about thirty-four inches long.38 The militia obtained sabers by going “to all the sawmills,” wrote Private James Collins, where they would “take all the old whip saws we could find, set three or four smiths to work. . . . [W]e soon had a pretty good supply of swords.” The militia “swords and knives, we polished mostly with a grindstone—not a very fine polish to be sure; but they were of a good temper, sharpened to a keen edge.”39 William Washington preferred sabers for combat, describing the sword as the “most destructive and almost the only necessary weapon a Dragoon carries.”40

  Most dragoons wore short jackets and distinctive caplike helmets to provide protection from injury by sabers. The caps often had embellishments such as fur, cloth bands, and unit insignia on them.41 British dragoons also wore distinctive, regimentally marked headgear.

  Cavalry scouted ahead of an advance, covered infantry deployment, provided flank protection, and engaged in direct headlong attacks. Cavalry tactics were predicated on moving rapidly, often in direct, frontal assault. Attacking cavalry could be in column with a narrow front designed to penetrate an enemy line. If they wished to overwhelm a position or sweep through an area with scattered opposition, a broad front with horsemen on line would be used. Against a steady enemy, especially one armed with bayonets, any direct attack would be disastrous, so flanking movements were used. These began in column, but cavalry could deploy rapidly on line. In pursuit of broken infantry, cavalry were at their most effective, and control was loosened as the men simply rode at will, hacking every opponent in sight.

  Cavalry were at their best in surprise actions, against men without bayonets, and against retreating, disordered infantry. To counter Tarleton’s dragoons, American riflemen were ordered to have “every third man to fire and two to remain in reserve, lest the cavalry should continue to advance after the first fire; or to be used if they wheeled to retire.”42 Morgan promised his militia that bayonet-armed Continental infantry would provide protection from the British dragoons.

  Cavalry against cavalry was common, especially when one side had the advantage of numbers or surprise, or when covering disputed ground between armies. Skirmishing occurred frequently in the South, and both sides saw much mounted combat before Cowpens. Generally, a cavalry attack against other mounted men was dictated by the space available, with as many men as possible on line but with some depth on occasion.

  Both sides used cavalry as a reserve force to exploit any opportunity. Because dragoons could move rapidly from point to point, they were ideal for taking advantage of any mistake by the opposing force. They could also move rapidly to cover a breakdown in their own ranks.

  Artillery men operated cannon, but individual artillery men were armed with either muskets or carbines. Tarleton’s force had two three-pounders, so named because they could fire a single solid shot weighing three pounds. These particular guns were also called grasshoppers because of the style of their carriage.43

  Artillery tactics were designed to produce a number of results, and the guns were given specialized projectiles for the purpose. For longer-range work, they used solid shot, in Tarleton’s case weighing three pounds. For closer work, both grape and case shot were available. These charges consisted of multiple balls, in effect turning the cannon into a giant shotgun to break up enemy formations. Case shot was basically a tin can containing iron balls; grape was stacked on a baseplate and wrapped in canvas and rope.44

  Initially, cannon fired solid shot at longer ranges. As the distance lessened, gunners switched to grape or case shot. In combat, point-blank artillery fire was understood as the range at which shot would first touch level ground when the gun barrel was level. The three-pounders used at Cowpens had a point-blank range of 180 yards, a little over the distance between the American lines at Cowpens.45

  British artillerist John Muller recommended ricochet firing because it saved powder and was more dangerous. After the first ricochet, a ball might bounce another 400 yards and still injure men waiting in reserve. Shot was bounced into enemy ranks, because it caused the disorder necessary before ordering a bayonet charge. Ricochet firing might also create panic because the enemy could see the shot coming. Furthermore, the bouncing shot threw up dirt and stones which also caused injuries.46

  Positioning cannon in a battle line depended on whether an attack or a defense was conducted. Traditionally, Europeans positioned guns with infantry battalions in intervals between companies. In the American campaigns, a gun often would be placed on a battalion flank if it were covered by another unit; or in the battle line where it had the best line of fire. The flank position could fire across an attacker’s front. A more central position could fire into the faces of attackers or defenders. In attacks, cannon were generally positioned about 100 yards away from the enemy, but light guns such as three-pounders were used for close support and moved along with the infantry.47

  Artillery rates of fire varied according to use, but the British had perfected a “quick-fire” drill to speed up firing. Guns such as the grasshopper could fire up to five or six rounds a minute, but this was excessive. Guns moving with infantry would have a much slower rate of fire.48

  In the employment of fighting forces as an integrated unit, Tarleton would attack with his infantry, cavalry, and artillery, virtually all of them veteran regulars. Tarleton was inclined to use a frontal charge, which worked well at Lenud’s Ferry, Monck’s Corner, Waxhaws, and Fishing Creek but proved of little success at Charlotte and Blackstock’s, a fact not lost on Americans who advised Morgan. In late December, Richard Winn went to Grindal Shoals and discussed Tarleton with Morgan and his staff. Winn noted, “Tarleton never brings on the attack himself. His mode of fighting is surprise. By doing this he sends two or three troops of horse, and, if he can throw the party into confusion, with his reserve he falls on [and] will cut them to pieces.”49

  Morgan planned a defensive stand with infantry, both rifle-armed militia and regulars with muskets, as the main resistance. The American cavalry, composed of militia and regulars, would perform in a supporting role. By
defending a position, Morgan minimized chances of disorder inherent in moving men across the landscape and selected the ground over which the British would have to move.

  2: The opponents

  I give this the name of a flying Army.

  —Nathanael Greene to Marquis de Lafayette, 29 December 1780

  THE AMERICANS

  Daniel Morgan’s Flying Army grew from company-sized elements in September 1780 into a sizable force by January 1781. Composed of three types of soldier—Continentals, state troops, and militia—the Flying Army was commanded by the one man most likely to achieve success with such a composite force. What, and who, these men were, and how they came to form Morgan’s force sheds light on the Revolutionary War in the South.1

  Daniel Morgan is hardly known as a Revolutionary hero today, but contemporaries considered his experience and talents as legendary. Morgan’s veterans remembered him as the “old Waggoner,” a nickname earned during the French and Indian War. Described as “stout and active, six feet in height,” his manners were plain, an image Morgan encouraged. Invariably portrayed in the hunting frock symbolic of riflemen and his leadership of them, his men identified with him. He “reflected deeply, spoke little, and executed with keen perseverance whatever he undertook.” Among intimates, Morgan “expressed his feelings without reserve.”2

  Morgan led through respect and by example. He was a powerful figure who feared no danger and sought the hottest action. During the French and Indian War, he suffered a wound in which the ball entered the back of his neck, passed through his mouth, taking out the left rear teeth, and emerged through his upper left lip. Contemporaries described a livid scar, but illustrations rarely show any indication, although Peale gave him a subdued mark.3